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Abstract 
Purpose – This paper draws on Adler and Borys’ (1996) concept of an enabling use of 
bureaucracy to examine how the integration of a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing 
system into the management control system is related to the perceived success of that transfer 
pricing system.  
Design/methodology/approach – Based on survey data from Swiss multinational firms, the 
authors test a structural equation model. In addition, the authors conduct interviews with 
executives from three multinational enterprises. 
Findings – The authors find that the integration of a tax compliant transfer pricing system 
into the management control system may be perceived to be successful in achieving both tax 
compliance and internal (control) purposes. This is particularly true when the transfer pricing 
system is transparent and can be amended in the case of fundamental management control 
problems. 
Research limitations/implications – The typical shortcomings of survey-based research 
apply to this study. Future research could build on this model and more closely investigate the 
relationship between transfer pricing system integration and an enabling use of the transfer 
pricing system. 
Practical implications – Based on this study’s findings, the authors recommend that a strong 
integration of tax compliant transfer prices into the management control system should be 
accompanied by internal transparency and the ability to repair the transfer pricing system.  
Originality/value – Prior research on the integration of transfer pricing and management 
control systems has either been analytical or based on case studies. This cross-sectional 
analysis provides reliable insights into different levels of integration, use and success of 
transfer pricing systems. 
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1. Introduction 
Transfer pricing has traditionally evolved to facilitate and influence internal decision-making 
within divisionally structured organizations, and it is thus an important accounting topic. Over 
recent decades, however, another purpose of transfer pricing has become increasingly 
important, namely, tax compliance. Because transfer prices determine the profits of legal 
entities within multinational enterprises, transfer prices can be used to minimize taxes. To 
hamper such tax minimization strategies, international guidelines, such as the OECD transfer 
pricing guidelines, govern the determination of transfer prices.  
Results from analytical research show that a single transfer price cannot simultaneously fulfill 
both internal (internal decision-making and control) and external (tax compliance and tax 
burden minimization) objectives (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe and Hyde, 2007; Hyde and 
Choe, 2005; Smith, 2002a). In an attempt to provide solutions to these goal conflicts, 
researchers have repeatedly called for the use of different transfer prices for different 
purposes, in particular, for the use of one set of books for tax compliance/tax optimization and 
another for internal management purposes (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe and Hyde, 2007). 
However, survey-based findings report that firms predominantly use the same transfer price 
for both internal and external (tax compliance) purposes (Ernst & Young, 2001; 2003; 2005). 
In addition, the use of one set of books may help signal that the transfer pricing system is 
driven by internal control considerations and not by tax optimization purposes (Ernst & 
Young, 2001; 2003). Even analytical researchers acknowledge that multinational enterprises, 
in practice, use one set of books, “both for simplicity and in order to avoid the possibility that 
multiple transfer prices become evidence in any disputes with the tax authorities” (Baldenius 
et al., 2004, p. 592). 
For these reasons, the advantages of decoupled over integrated tax compliant transfer prices 
are questionable, in particular, since transfer pricing and management control systems are 
highly complex and dynamic instead of exogenously given and static (the latter being 
common assumptions in analytical modeling). Recently, case-based studies have analyzed the 
consequences of implementing a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing system for the 
design and use of various components of the management control system (Cools, 2014; Cools 
et al., 2008; Cools and Slagmulder, 2009; Rossing and Rohde, 2010). However, besides these 
case-based studies, little empirical evidence exists on how firms address the conflict between 
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management control purposes and tax compliance and on the degree of integration of transfer 
pricing systems into management control systems from an overall perspective. As a result, 
Cools et al. (2008, p. 626) call for future research on the consequences of integrated transfer 
pricing systems. 
We respond to this call and draw on Adler and Borys’ (1996) concept of an enabling use of 
bureaucracy to examine how the integration of a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing 
system into the management control system is related to the perceived success of that transfer 
pricing system. Note that we measure transfer pricing system success based on assessments of 
the satisfaction with the transfer pricing system in terms of the fulfillment of both tax 
compliance and management control objectives. In particular, we investigate two related 
research questions using survey data:  
(i) Can tax compliant transfer pricing system integration be positively related to 
transfer pricing system success as perceived by the corporate-level authorities 
responsible for transfer pricing?  
(ii) Is this relationship mediated by enabling use of the transfer pricing system, which 
is reflected in repairability, transparency, and flexibility?  
To shed light on these questions, we conduct an empirical study that is characterized by the 
following aspects. First, in contrast to previous studies on transfer pricing (for an overview, 
see Cools, 2014), this study employs a perspective that goes beyond the analysis of transfer 
pricing methods (e.g., cost-plus or resale-minus transfer prices) applied in single transactions. 
In particular, we analyze a firm’s transfer pricing system in its entirety. This approach is in 
line with the reasoning of Rossing and Rohde (2014) and enables us to account for the broad 
area of transfer price application within multinational enterprises. Furthermore, taking a 
holistic view of taxpayers’ intercompany transactions is in line with recent OECD 
developments, such as the base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS) project, and it is a 
consequence of the changing view of tax authorities (Ernst & Young, 2013, p. 29). 
Second, to measure the level of integration between the transfer pricing system and the 
management control system, we use information on how strictly transfer prices enter the 
budget planning, cost accounting, performance evaluation and bonus systems of the 
responsibility centers. All of these parts of the management control system are usually seen as 
instruments for achieving decision-making and control in multidivisional and multinational 
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firms (see, for example, Horngren et al., 2015, p. 868; Kaplan and Atkinson, 2014; 
Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 185-188).  
Third, with respect to the use of the transfer pricing system, we rely on Adler and Borys’ 
(1996) concept of an enabling use of bureaucracy. This concept is well established in 
management accounting research (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Chapman and Kihn, 2009; 
Free, 2007; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Wouters and Wilderom, 2008) and is particularly 
useful for examining the simultaneous use of highly structured controls (Ahrens and 
Chapman, 2004, p. 276), a phenomenon that is also prevalent in transfer pricing.  
Results from a partial least squares (PLS) analysis of survey data from 38 multinational 
enterprises indicate that the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the 
management control system is positively and significantly correlated with the success of the 
transfer pricing system as perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer 
pricing. A considerable part of this correlation is due to the mediating variables repair and 
internal transparency. To substantiate our survey results in terms of a robustness test, we 
contrast them with findings based on interviews with the corporate-level managers 
responsible for transfer pricing at three multinational enterprises.  
Our study makes several contributions to the literature. First, our study complements 
analytical research (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe and Hyde, 2007; Hyde and Choe, 2005; 
Smith, 2002a; 2002b) by analyzing empirical data from a diverse set of firms and providing 
new insights into the question of how multinational enterprises handle the (supposed) trade-
off between the tax compliance and management control objectives of transfer pricing. 
Second, the results of our study can help substantiate case-based findings (Cools et al., 2008; 
Rossing and Rohde, 2010) by providing reliable insights into different levels of integration, 
use and success of transfer pricing systems. Third, our perspective on transfer pricing, which 
is independent of transactions and transfer pricing methods, allows us to examine differences 
in the use of the transfer pricing system. Practical implications from our research include the 
finding that a strong integration of tax compliant transfer prices into the management control 
system goes along with internal transparency and the ability to repair the transfer pricing 
system. In this respect, our research speaks to Rossing and Rohde (2014, p. 283), who 
“encourage researchers of transfer pricing to recognize that accounting is an applied discipline 
and should be researched accordingly.” 
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The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The second section reviews and 
summarizes the related literature and elaborates the formulation of our hypotheses. The 
research design and data are described in the third section. The fourth section presents 
descriptive statistics and results from structural equation modeling along with results from 
additional robustness analyses and interview findings. The final section concludes the paper. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Related Transfer Pricing Literature 
The transfer pricing literature addresses both the management control role and the taxation 
issues of transfer prices. While the internal objectives of transfer pricing have traditionally 
been at the forefront of (analytical) researchers’ thinking,[1] more recent transfer pricing 
studies analyze the design of transfer prices with respect to both internal and external (in 
particular tax-related) objectives in decentralized organizations (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe 
and Hyde, 2007; Halperin and Srinidhi, 1991; Hyde and Choe, 2005; Narayanan and Smith, 
2000). Most of these researchers either focus on a single transfer price, which would 
optimally balance the conflict between tax optimization and internal resource allocation 
(Baldenius et al., 2004), or they decouple the internally used transfer price from the “arm’s 
length price” by using two sets of books (Baldenius et al., 2004; Choe and Hyde, 2007; Hyde 
and Choe, 2005). These findings from analytical research have advanced our understanding 
on the trade-offs between different transfer pricing objectives, yet these models are not able to 
account for the complex and dynamic nature of both transfer pricing systems and management 
control systems in practice. In particular, these analytical models share a common notion of a 
static and exogenously given management control system, a focus on a particular transaction 
and a disregard for variation in the level of integration of the transfer pricing system and the 
management control system. Moreover, these models do not incorporate how a transfer 
pricing system is used (in terms of transparency, repair, and flexibility).  
Aside from analytical research on transfer pricing, a considerable number of empirical studies 
focus on transfer pricing (Cools, 2014; Rossing and Rohde, 2014). In a recent review of the 
empirical transfer pricing literature, Cools (2014, p. 14) identifies three research streams: 
early studies on the management control issues of transfer pricing, tax accounting studies and 
studies on the relationship between tax-compliant transfer pricing systems and the design and 
use of management control systems. In our literature review, we concentrate on the “early” 
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empirical transfer pricing studies and studies that explicitly investigate the relationship 
between transfer pricing and management control systems. 
A considerable part of this early research on transfer pricing draws on contingency theory. In 
a contingency-based approach, accounting systems are designed to optimally account for the 
influence of both organizational (internal) and environmental (external) factors (Gordon and 
Miller, 1976; Gordon and Narayanan, 1984; Otley, 1980). With respect to transfer pricing, the 
basic research question is which transfer price is chosen given the existence of certain 
organizational and environmental factors.  
Some highly recognized transfer pricing frameworks have evolved from the contingency 
school of management accounting research, namely, the frameworks developed by Eccles 
(1985), Emmanuel and Mehafdi (1994), and Colbert and Spicer (1995). These frameworks 
describe how transfer prices are influenced by the firm’s strategy (Eccles, 1985), the asset 
specificity of the transferred goods (Colbert and Spicer, 1995) and other environmental and 
organizational variables (Emmanuel and Mehafdi, 1994).  
However, empirical evidence on these frameworks is scarce. Survey-based studies are mainly 
focused on the transfer pricing method as a dependent variable and yield ambiguous results 
(for a meta-analysis, see Borkowski (1996)). Some researchers claim that the discrepancy 
between the level of the survey (firm level) and the level of the transfer pricing decision 
(subunit level) is the primary reason for these inconsistent findings (Boyns et al., 1999; 
Colbert and Spicer, 1995; Cools, 2014).  
This discrepancy is overcome by case-based research that investigates transfer pricing at the 
subunit level (Boyns et al., 1999; Colbert and Spicer, 1995; Cools et al., 2008; Eccles, 1985; 
Rossing and Rohde, 2010; Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994; Van Helden et al., 2001). However, 
most of this case-based research focuses on domestic transfer pricing and thus neglects the tax 
compliance role of international transfer pricing (Boyns et al., 1999; Colbert and Spicer, 
1995; Van der Meer-Kooistra, 1994). Only Cools et al. (2008) and Rossing and Rohde (2010) 
investigate interrelations between a firm’s international transfer pricing and its management 
control system. These researchers show that a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing 
system interacts with the design and use of various components of the management control 
systems, namely the overhead cost allocation, the budgeting and the performance evaluation 
system.  
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More precisely, Cools et al. (2008) find that the implementation of a single-book tax-
compliant transfer pricing system results in a more coercive use of the management control 
system. While a higher level of transparency is achieved under the new transfer pricing 
system, losses in flexibility occur “due to the uniform transfer pricing policy, which need[s] to 
be consistently applied under all circumstances” (Cools et al., 2008, p. 625). Similarly, 
Rossing and Rohde (2010, p. 212) reveal “an increase in the formalization of services and a 
discontinuation of allocations by divisions to business units […] in order to enhance external 
acceptance of overhead cost allocation.” In addition, based on internal accounting data from a 
large company, Bouwens and Steens (2016) show that although the use of full-cost transfer 
pricing can send upstream production into a death spiral, the retention of the price can serve 
as a credible commitment device to motivate managers to reduce cost. This result again 
illustrates the complexity of transfer pricing systems in practice for which analytical research 
cannot account. 
Taken together, this literature review illustrates that insights into the relationship between 
transfer pricing and the management control system are primarily provided by case-based 
research. Consequently, Rossing and Rohde (2014, p. 282) conclude that “transfer pricing 
research should ultimately aim for statistical generalization based on the richness of data”. 
Our study particularly focuses on whether the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system is positively associated with the success of the 
transfer pricing system as perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer 
pricing. In addition, we investigate the use of the transfer pricing system – enabling versus 
coercive – which is delineated in the following subsection (section 2.2). 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
We draw on prior literature and Adler and Borys’ (1996) framework of an enabling use of 
bureaucracy to develop our hypotheses. Enabling formalization “[…] designs organizational 
rules that reckon with the intelligence of workers so that formal procedures need not be 
designed to make the work process foolproof […]” (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004, p. 279). 
Coercive formalization, in contrast, reflects the typical top-down approach, accentuating 
centralization and leaving employees with a limited scope of action. Adler and Borys (1996) 
identify four characteristics that foster an enabling approach to management control: repair, 
internal transparency, global transparency and flexibility. Repairabilty is “the ease with which 
users can repair the process themselves rather than allowing the breakdown to force the work 
7 
 
process to a halt.” (Adler and Borys, 1996: 70) Internal transparency provides users with “an 
understanding of the underlying theory of this process by clarifying the rationale of the rules.” 
(Adler and Borys, 1996: 72) Global transparency provides users with “an understanding of 
where their own tasks fit into the whole.” (Adler and Borys, 1996: 73) The last principle, 
flexibility, indicates that a certain degree of elasticity is needed in a dynamic environment 
with developing markets and legal amendments.  
The Adler and Borys (1996) framework has been applied to various settings in management 
accounting research, such as the study of management control or performance measurement 
systems (Ahrens and Chapman, 2004; Wouters and Roijmans, 2011; Wouters and Wilderom, 
2008), inter-organizational alliances (Free, 2007), transfer pricing and the use of management 
control systems (Cools et al., 2008) and information-system integration (Chapman and Kihn, 
2009).  
Our first hypothesis argues for a positive relationship between the level of integration of tax 
compliant international transfer pricing into the management control system and the perceived 
success of that transfer pricing system.[2] Our reasoning derives from the traditional role of 
transfer prices as facilitating and influencing internal decision-making. Transfer prices affect 
some of the most important management and coordination processes such as budgeting and 
performance evaluations of division managers, with effects on decision-making and both 
division and overall company profit. These elements of the management control system are 
usually portrayed as instruments for achieving decentralization and coordination in 
multidivisional and multinational firms (see, for example, Horngren et al., 2015, p. 868; 
Kaplan and Atkinson, 2014; Zimmermann, 2013, pp. 185-188). By providing the relevant 
data, transfer prices that are integrated into the management control system enhance the 
transparency of internal decision-making. Compared to decoupled transfer prices, integrated 
transfer pricing systems are often preferred “both for simplicity and in order to avoid […] any 
disputes with the tax authorities” (Baldenius et al., 2004, p. 592). In addition, integrated 
transfer pricing systems are helpful to signal that transfer prices are driven by internal 
considerations instead of tax optimization (Ernst & Young, 2001; 2003). Moreover, case-
based research also reveals a high level of integration of tax compliant international transfer 
pricing into the management control system of a firm (Cools et al., 2008; Rossing and Rohde, 
2010). Consequently, we formally state the first hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system and the success of the transfer pricing system as 
perceived by the corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer pricing. 
Drawing on Adler and Borys (1996), we argue that the level of transfer pricing system 
integration fosters the enabling use of the transfer pricing system, which is reflected by the 
four design characteristics: repair, internal and global transparency, and flexibility. Repair 
refers to the ability to reconfigure processes if unforeseen problems occur. If tax compliant 
transfer prices are integrated into the management control system, inconsistencies and failures 
in the transfer pricing system would be detected and repaired through adjustments of the 
transfer pricing system. For instance, a cost-plus transfer price that does not provide the 
supplying division with an appropriate profit might reflect inefficiencies in the supplying 
division or the need for adjustments of the transfer price. Either way, managers would become 
aware of problematic transfer pricing through the use of transfer prices in the management 
control system. A similar example is provided by Cools et al. (2008, p. 622).  
Moreover, if the management control system and thus the decision-making of divisional 
managers are affected by transfer prices, these managers need to understand how transfer 
prices are determined. Therefore, the second design principle for an enabling use of 
bureaucracy is internal transparency, which guarantees that users truly comprehend the 
nature of the system. Only if employees understand the rationale behind a rule can a deeper 
understanding be achieved. Such an understanding requires a thorough documentation of the 
transfer pricing system and access to all information related to the transfer pricing system. 
Therefore, the level of integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control 
system is positively associated with internal transparency.  
In addition to internal transparency, global transparency is also necessary to foster an 
enabling use of bureaucracy. Global transparency refers to a broader understanding of a firm’s 
actions and strategies. If transfer prices are relevant for management control purposes, 
managers need to understand the achieved internal and external objectives of transfer pricing 
and the effect of their actions not only on their responsibility center but also on the company 
as a whole. It is argued that such an overall perspective can prevent division managers from 
taking actions that could harm the company. In an enabling approach, operators have access 
to extensive information concerning the entire value chain. Therefore, the transfer pricing 
system helps to clarify the value-creation process of the firm and supports optimizing efforts 
by division managers to improve the profits not only of their responsibility centers but also of 
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the whole firm. Such a comprehensive understanding is fostered through the global 
transparency of the transfer pricing system, and we therefore expect to find a positive 
relationship between the level of integration and global transparency. 
The last enabling characteristic relates to the flexible use of the transfer pricing system. In 
some cases, determining tax compliant and control-relevant transfer prices according to pre-
set rules and internal policies might not be feasible. Instead, a certain degree of flexibility may 
be needed in a dynamic environment with developing markets and legal amendments. 
Flexibility refers to the ability to disregard internal policies and flexibly handle the 
determination of transfer prices in particular cases. Cools et al. (2008, p. 622) provide an 
example of such a flexible adjustment of transfer prices due to market pressure. Other 
exceptions may relate to the pricing of extraordinarily large orders or the entry into new 
markets. However, due to the statutory character of international transfer prices, such 
exceptions need to be carefully justified and documented. Taken together, we argue that the 
level of integration is positively associated with the four design characteristics of repair, 
internal transparency, global transparency, and flexibility. These relationships are formally 
hypothesized in H2a-H2d: 
H2: There is a positive relationship between the level of integration of the transfer pricing 
system into the management control system and the enabling use of the transfer pricing 
system as reflected by the characteristics of (a) repair, (b) internal transparency, (c) global 
transparency, and (d) flexibility. 
Finally, we argue that the enabling use of the transfer pricing system is positively associated 
with the transfer pricing system’s success. If fundamental problems in transfer pricing 
systems cannot be corrected, the transfer prices become useless for management control 
purposes. Therefore, we expect repair to be positively associated with transfer pricing system 
success. Similarly, internal and global transparency are positively associated with transfer 
pricing system success because these characteristics directly support managers in their 
decision-making function. Moreover, global transparency ensures that the implications of 
local processes are visible across the entire company, and thus it fosters the alignment of 
divisional and corporate goals. Finally, a flexible use of transfer pricing systems is necessary 
to account for exceptions and thus to prevent deteriorated divisional stewardship. Taken 
together, the presence of each of the four characteristics is expected to boost the perceived 
success of the transfer pricing system.  
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H3: There is a positive relationship between an enabling use of the transfer pricing system as 
reflected by the characteristics of (a) repair, (b) internal transparency, (c) global 
transparency, and (d) flexibility and the transfer pricing system’s success as perceived by the 
corporate-level authorities responsible for transfer pricing.  
Figure 1 displays the structural model underlying the paper. Note that our line of reasoning 
applies to both firms with enabling and firms with coercive use of the transfer pricing system 
since we expect positive relationships between transfer pricing system integration and the four 
design characteristics (H2a-H2d) as well as between the four design characteristics and 
perceived transfer pricing system success (H3a-H3d). Thus, we expect to find enabling 
(coercive) use of the transfer pricing system in firms with high (low) levels of transfer pricing 
system integration. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
3. Research Design and Data 
3.1. Sample Selection and Survey Design 
We conducted a questionnaire-based survey according to the basic elements of the tailored 
design method by Dillman et al. (2014). Our main variables of interest are measured using a 
seven-point Likert-type scale, indicating the degree of agreement with the statement. 
Specifically, 1 refers to ‘does not apply’ and 7 refers to ‘applies completely’. The survey 
collected information not only on the main variables of interest but also on the transfer pricing 
methods applied by the firm for different types of internal transactions. Thus, the focus of our 
study and our hypotheses were not readily apparent to the respondents, which limits response 
bias. The items measuring TPS integration, as well as the four design characteristics, were 
distributed throughout the questionnaire and are described in greater detail in the next section. 
The survey was conducted electronically. During preparation of the survey, a pre-test with 
managerial accounting, transfer pricing and tax experts was conducted, and some questions 
were adjusted based on the experts’ suggestions.  
The survey was sent to all companies listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SIX) in July 2012, 
except for companies in the financial services sector.[3] All of the 158 companies were first 
contacted by telephone. After a company agreed to participate in the survey, a questionnaire 
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was sent to an employee in a corporate function with detailed knowledge of the company’s 
transfer pricing system. We targeted employees in corporate functions for several reasons. 
First, our model focuses on the overall transfer pricing system and not on specific 
transactions. This perspective is best represented at the corporate level. Second, transfer prices 
typically split up the profit of a business  into a supplying division and a receiving division of 
a delivered good or service, thus resulting in a zero-sum game (for a given transaction). The 
transfer price represents revenue for the supplying division and cost for the receiving division. 
Satisfaction with the transfer pricing system can thus vary between (the respective) divisions. 
Third, if transfer prices cause conflicts between the parties involved, these conflicts are 
typically resolved at the corporate level. Thus, the corporate level is most likely to provide an 
overview of such conflicts. Fourth, our measurement of the perceived success of the transfer 
pricing system includes both internal and external objectives, namely, tax compliance. These 
external objectives are best assessed at the corporate level. In total, we received 38 completed 
questionnaires, equaling a response rate of 24 percent. Panel A of Table 1 presents an 
overview of our final sample of 38 companies by industry group. Overall, the sample firms 
are rather evenly distributed across the nine industry groups (with a weak majority of 
mechanical and plant engineering (8 firms) and only 1 or 2 telecommunications, electronics 
and utilities firms). Thus, we do not expect to have systematic bias in our data due to industry 
specifics. Panel B of Table 1 shows the sample distribution by organizational level of the 
respondent. As expected, most of the respondents belong to the group level (n=31) with some 
respondents from the controlling (parent) company, subsidiary companies, and divisions 
within a legal entity. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
The average company has 4,718 employees, ranging between 235 and 26,000 employees 
(median 2,084). Net sales average 2.033 billion CHF with a range of 40 million CHF to 13 
billion CHF. The average international portion of net sales equals 65 percent, emphasizing the 
importance of transfer prices with respect to profit allocation among business units. 
3.2. Variables Measurement  
For the measurement of the four variables reflecting an enabling use of the transfer pricing 
system as well as of the transfer pricing system’s success, we transfer Chapman and Kihn’s 
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(2009) measurement approaches into a transfer pricing context. For the measurement of 
transfer pricing system integration, we rely on literature descriptions of the use of transfer 
prices for management control purposes (Horngren et al., 2015; Kaplan and Atkinson, 2014; 
Zimmermann, 2013). All variables are designed based on the results of the principal 
component analysis (PCA)[4] with oblique Oblimin rotations[5] and Cronbach’s alpha as a 
measure of internal consistency and reliability (Cronbach, 1951). To reflect the theoretical 
constructs, three independent PCAs are conducted: first, a PCA including the items measuring 
transfer pricing system integration; second, a PCA addressing the four mediating design 
characteristics of flexibility, global transparency, internal transparency, and repair; and third, 
a PCA checking the factorability of items measuring transfer pricing system success. Items 
that do not match with the theoretical construct are dropped to obtain latent variables that 
reflect the underlying theoretical model.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Table 2 displays the factor loadings from the three PCAs. All of the factor loadings greater 
than 0.45 are highlighted in gray. According to Hair et al. (2010, p. 117), factor loadings 
above 0.5 are considered practically significant, and loadings above 0.70 are described as the 
“goal of any factor analysis.” Except for one item (no. 3), all of the factor loadings are above 
0.70, and 16 (out of 19 items) have factor loadings of 0.75 or higher.[6] In addition, the cross 
loadings are rather small, with the highest (positive) cross loading equaling only 0.321 (item 
no. 11).  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
For each of the variables, Table 3 presents the general definitions and measurement items 
used in the questionnaire along with examples from interview data. Based on the results from 
the PCA (Table 2), the variables are calculated as the mean values of the items that are 
highlighted in gray in Table 3. 
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Transfer pricing system integration 
We include three of the initial five items to measure the level of integration between the 
transfer pricing system and the management control system (TPS integration). Primarily, a 
two-component solution was obtained. Because the first component, which includes the 
majority of the items (including item no. 1, which directly asks for the transfer pricing system 
integration), explains a higher proportion of the variance (0.51) and obtains a higher 
Cronbach’s alpha (0.51), the second component is dropped. The Cronbach’s alpha is rather 
low, which likely reflects the heterogeneous nature of the variable.[7] The eigenvalue of the 
factor TPS integration equals 1.54. TPS integration includes an overall judgment of the level 
of integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control system, the degree 
of integration of transfer prices into budgetary planning and the degree of integration of 
information from cost accounting into the determination of transfer prices. 
 
Characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system 
Repair is measured by including two of the initial four items in the PCA. These items include 
the ability of those responsibility centers affected by transfer pricing to initiate a revision of 
the transfer pricing in case of fundamental problems and their ability to hold open discussions 
on problems with transfer pricing. Because both items load on the same factor, that factor is 
considered to be repair in the subsequent analysis. Repair has an eigenvalue of 1.40, explains 
13 percent of the variance and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.66.  
Measuring internal transparency by including all four items appears to be appropriate 
because they all load on the second factor (called internal transparency in the subsequent 
analysis). Internal transparency means that responsibility centers affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand the determination process, that they have access to the relevant data and 
to the documentation of the transfer pricing system and that the company keeps detailed 
records on the transfer pricing system. The eigenvalue of internal transparency equals 3.53, it 
explains 32 percent of the variance and its Cronbach’s alpha is 0.84. 
Global transparency is best reflected by two of the initial four items of the questionnaire. 
These items refer first to the suitability of transfer pricing systems for clarifying the value 
creation of each responsibility center and second to the potential for each responsibility center 
to compare its financial performance to that of the others. Global transparency has an 
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eigenvalue of 1.12, explains an additional 10 percent of the variance and has a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.62. 
We include three of the initial four items to measure the degree of flexibility in the transfer 
pricing system. These items relate to the disregard of internal transfer pricing policies 
(internal guidelines) and the flexible handling of transfer prices in particular cases. Moreover, 
we include a reverse-coded item for which no exceptions to the internal policies or guidelines 
on transfer pricing are allowed. The factor flexibility has an eigenvalue of 2.29, explains an 
additional 21 percent of the variance and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.71. 
Taken together, the results from the PCA indicate that the underlying theoretical constructs 
are appropriately reflected by the data. In particular, only five of the initial 16 items were 
dropped. The remaining eleven items clearly identify the four assumed mediating design 
characteristics of an enabling use of the MCS, explaining 76 percent of the total variance. 
 
Perceived transfer pricing system success  
Perceived transfer pricing system success (Perceived TPS success) is measured by five of the 
initial seven items. These items include assessments of the responsibility centers’ overall 
satisfaction with the transfer pricing system, the cost-benefit analysis, the tax compliance of 
the transfer pricing system and the fulfillment of internal and external objectives. The TPS 
success factor explains 63 percent of the variance, has an eigenvalue of 3.13 and a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.85. It includes the overall satisfaction with the transfer pricing system, cost-benefit 
considerations, the degree of compliance of the transfer pricing system with tax regulations 
and an evaluation of the fulfillment of the internal and external purposes of transfer pricing. 
3.3. Methodological Approach 
Our hypotheses on the relationships between transfer pricing system integration, the four 
characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system and the success of the transfer 
pricing system are investigated through structural equation analysis by applying the partial 
least squares (PLS) technique. In particular, we rely on the software SmartPLS 3.2.0 for our 
statistical analyses. PLS has recently gained ground in the accounting literature (e.g., 
Chapman and Kihn, 2009; Chong and Law, 2016; Hall, 2008; 2011; Hartmann and Slapničar, 
2012; Nitzl, 2014; Nitzl and Hirsch, 2016) because it is particularly useful for analyzing 
complex relationships when prior theoretical knowledge on the relationships is limited and 
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sample sizes are rather small.[8] Therefore, it appears to be ideal for estimating the 
association between transfer pricing system integration and transfer pricing system success 
while accounting for the mediating effect of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. 
Bootstrapping using 5,000 samples with replacement is applied. Following Hair et al. (2013, 
p. 252), the number of bootstrap cases is adjusted to the number of observations in our 
sample. 
PLS analysis is comprised of a measurement and a structural model. To ensure the appropriate 
interpretation of the results from the structural model, the validity and reliability of the latent 
variables (i.e., the measurement model) need to be ensured (Hulland, 1999). As reported in 
Table 2, the factor loadings are above 0.7 for 18 (out of 19) items, and thus internal reliability 
is supported (Hair et al., 2011). In addition, Table 4 displays common validity and reliability 
measures for the latent variables of the model. Internal consistency reliability is ensured 
because the composite reliability of each latent variable is higher than 0.7 (Nunnally and 
Bernstein, 1994). Convergent validity is guaranteed because the average variance extracted 
(AVE) is above 0.5 for all of the variables (Hair et al., 2010). Discriminant validity is 
confirmed because the AVE of each latent variable is higher than its shared variance (squared 
correlation) with any other construct (Fornell and Larcker, 1981).[9] According to Hair et al. 
(2011), an item’s factor loading should additionally be greater than any of its cross loadings; 
this condition is also fulfilled (Table 2). Taken together, all of the latent variables meet the 
validity and reliability criteria.[10] 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Because both the independent and the dependent variables from the model are obtained from 
the same survey (answered by the same person in the same measurement context), common 
method variance (CMV) may bias the results (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 885). Therefore, we 
followed several procedures recommended in the literature to avoid CMV as far as possible. 
Ex ante, we tried to reduce CMV by guaranteeing respondents anonymity, using neutral 
wording, reducing comprehension problems by wording questions as precisely as possible[11] 
(Harrison et al., 1996; Lindell and Whitney, 2001) and integrating some questions worded 
with an opposing orientation. Ex post, the mediating role of our design characteristics adds 
complexity to our model, reducing the influencing potential of CMV. Moreover, we perform 
some statistical tests in order to ensure that our findings are not solely driven by CMV.  
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First, we employ Harman’s single-factor test by performing a PCA (without rotation) 
including all items of our model.[12] Following Podsakoff and Organ (1986), a single 
resulting factor or a factor accounting for the majority of covariance between the items would 
signal the prevalence of CMV. However, the PCA reveals six factors with eigenvalues greater 
than one, and the first factor accounts for 32 percent of total variance only, indicating that 
CMV is not pervasively affecting our results. Second, another promising approach to control 
for CMV is the use of a marker variable (Lindell and Brandt, 2000; Lindell and Whitney, 
2001). A marker variable should theoretically not be correlated to the other variables (at least 
to one) used in the model; if there are observed correlations between the marker variable and 
the other variables, these are assumed to be caused by CMV. Such a procedure allows 
researchers to parcel out the effect of CMV from observed relationships (Podsakoff et al., 
2003). Therefore, using financial performance as a marker variable,[13] we test the biasing 
effect of CMV on our results. After controlling for CMV, the correlations between TPS 
integration and TPS success remain in a range between 0.37 and 0.49, the correlations 
between repair and TPS success remain in a range between 0.52 and 0.62, and the correlations 
between internal transparency and TPS success remain in a range between 0.54 and 0.62.[14] 
Considering these stable and highly significant values, we conclude that CMV does not 
primarily drive our results.  
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for our model variables are presented in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 
gives an overview of the raw data. Variables are calculated as the mean values of the items 
and theoretically range between 1 and 7. On average, the transfer pricing system appears to be 
well integrated, and firms perceive their transfer pricing systems as being rather successful 
(mean values of 5.00 and 5.08, respectively). This finding supports our reasoning that transfer 
prices are indeed (well) integrated into the management control system and not decoupled. 
Note that we only ask for international transfer prices and that the sample companies have, on 
average, 65 percent of total sales internationally. In contrast to these rather high mean values 
for TPS integration and TPS success, the mean values of the four design characteristics are 
lower, ranging between 3.84 and 4.76. Within these four variables, we observe the highest 
mean value for repairabilty, indicating that transfer pricing systems are generally repairable. 
The lowest mean value corresponds to global transparency, indicating that the transparency of 
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transfer prices and of their effects across different responsibility centers is rather limited. 
Moreover, the flexible use of the transfer pricing system is not widespread, which may reflect 
concerns regarding potential disputes with the tax authorities. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
----------------------------------- 
For further analyses, variables are computed as the average standardized response of all items 
loading above 0.45 on a particular factor (Table 5, Panel B), which is considered to be an 
appropriate critical value for exploratory research (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001).[15]  
Panel C of Table 5 presents the sampling of our firms along two dimensions: the 
formalization type (coercive versus enabling) and the level of TPS integration (low versus 
high). Our variable formalization is measured based on the average of the standardized 
variables for the four design characteristics. We classify firms with formalization below 
(equal to or above) zero as coercive (enabling) organizations. Likewise, we classify firms with 
TPS integration below (equal to or above) zero as low integration (high integration) 
organizations. According to this classification, 20 of our sample firms have a low level of TPS 
integration, whereas 28 firms have a high level of TPS integration. Of the firms with a low 
level of TPS integration, 65 percent have coercive formalization. Similarly, 72 percent of the 
firms with a high level of TPS integration have enabling use of the TPS system. These first 
insights support our reasoning that a high level of TPS integration is in line with the use of an 
enabling transfer pricing system. 
Panel D of Table 5 presents Pearson correlation coefficients for these standardized variables. 
As expected, TPS integration is positively and significantly correlated with internal 
transparency, repair and TPS success. Moreover, TPS success is also positively and 
significantly correlated with repair and internal transparency. While there are also significant 
relationships between our four design variables for an enabling use of the transfer pricing 
system (in particular between repair and internal transparency, global transparency and 
flexibility as well as between global transparency and repair), the corresponding variance 
inflation factors do not indicate multicollinearity problems. Overall, the correlation statistics 
provide univariate evidence that supports our expected relationships between TPS integration, 
an enabling use of the transfer pricing system and TPS success. In contrast to our 
expectations, global transparency is negatively correlated with TPS success, but this 
relationship is not significant. 
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4.2. Results from Structural Equation Modeling  
Our structural equation model tests the hypotheses that transfer pricing system integration is 
positively related to transfer pricing system success (H1), that transfer pricing system 
integration is positively related to an enabling use of the system as reflected by repair, internal 
transparency, global transparency, and flexibility (H2a-H2d) and that an enabling use of the 
transfer pricing system as reflected by its four design characteristics is positively related to its 
success (H3a-H3d). Table 6 presents our results on path coefficients, corresponding levels of 
statistical significance, multiple squared correlations (mult. R2) and effect sizes (f2). 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
With respect to the first hypothesis H1, the results of the PLS analysis indicate a positive 
association between the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control 
system and transfer pricing system success (Table 6, Panel A). However, the link is 
significant at the 0.10 level only (one-tailed test). Therefore, we find only weak support for 
hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, the total effect of TPS integration on TPS success – including the 
indirect (mediating) effects through internal transparency, global transparency, repair, and 
flexibility – is substantial and highly significant, thereby emphasizing the overall importance 
of transfer pricing system integration (coefficient of 0.478, p-value of 0.000, untabulated). 
Thus, as assumed by our research design, the association between TPS integration and TPS 
success appears to be mediated through internal transparency, global transparency, repair, and 
flexibility.  
Regarding the second set of hypotheses on the relationship between TPS integration and the 
four characteristics of an enabling use of the transfer pricing system (H2a-H2d), the results of 
the PLS analysis indicate positive and significant associations for three of the four design 
variables (Table 6, Panel A). In particular, TPS integration is positively related to repair 
(0.336, p<0.05), internal transparency (0.388, p<0.01), and global transparency (0.246, 
p<0.10). These findings strongly support hypotheses H2a, H2b and weakly support H2c. 
While the relationship between TPS integration and flexibility is also positive, it is not 
significant and thus does not support hypothesis H2d (0.183, p>0.10). 
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-H3d) along with 
the effect sizes and the multiple squared correlations for TPS success. Consistent with H3a 
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and H3b, there are significant positive relationships between repair and TPS success (0.450, 
p<0.01) as well as between internal transparency and TPS success (0.321, p<0.05). However, 
global transparency and flexibility both have a negative (but not significant) association with 
TPS success. Therefore, we find only partial support for our third set of hypotheses. The 
multiple R2 for TPS success equals 0.605, indicating that TPS integration and the four 
variables of an enabling use explain 61 percent of the variance of TPS success (adjusted 
R2=0.543). Compared with similar studies (e.g., Chapman and Kihn, 2009; Hall, 2008; 2011), 
this value can be considered rather high, thereby indicating a good fit for our model. 
Overall, the results of the PLS analysis partially support our theoretical model. In particular, 
our results provide evidence not only for a direct positive relationship between TPS 
integration and TPS success but especially for indirect positive relationships through the 
characteristics repair (0.163, p=0.065) and internal transparency (0.129, p=0.076). This result 
is also reflected by a Cohen’s effect size f2, equaling 0.133 for TPS integration, 0.360 for 
repair and 0.181 for internal transparency.[16] In other words, stronger integration of the 
transfer pricing system into the management control system is associated with the higher 
success of the transfer pricing system, and this relationship is further enhanced through the 
enabling characteristics repair and internal transparency. However, although statistically not 
significant, we find negative associations between global transparency (as well as flexibility) 
and TPS success. One potential reason could be that the increased transparency of the transfer 
pricing system across different responsibility centers generates additional conflicts between 
the managers of these responsibility centers because the value creation of each responsibility 
center becomes more visible. The insignificant result for flexibility might reflect concerns 
about potential disputes with the tax authorities that are associated with a flexible use of the 
transfer pricing system.[17]  
4.3. Robustness Analyses 
We perform several additional analyses to investigate the robustness of our survey-based 
findings. First, we address concerns regarding the computation of our variables and our 
approach of separately calculating the measurement and the structural model. There is a 
controversy in the literature regarding the different methods for estimating factor scores. In 
our analysis, we rely on the common approach of computing the variables as the average 
standardized response of items (see also Chapman and Kihn, 2009). Alternatively, we use 
regression-based factor scores as an initial sensitivity check for our results. Following such a 
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procedure means that a factor is no longer described as the average of the standardized items 
with high loadings only but is rather described by each item, while the weight of an item 
directly depends on the size of its respective factor loading (Hair et al., 2010, p. 117). The 
results (untabulated) of the path model analysis based on bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings 
using regression-based factor scores are similar to our initial results. In particular, there are no 
differences with respect to the direction, but there are differences with respect to the 
magnitude for some of the estimated effects, confirming our main findings.  
Second, we conduct a PLS analysis using the items from the main model before 
standardization. With this procedure, SmartPLS optimizes the complete (i.e., measurement 
and structural) model including the weighting of the single items. Again, the results 
(untabulated) are similar to our main analyses with one exception. The direct relationship 
between TPS integration and TPS success becomes insignificant, and TPS integration is thus 
positively associated with TPS success only through an enabling use of the transfer pricing 
system.  
Third, our initial step-wise procedure of first performing principal component analyses and 
second testing our hypotheses based on the PLS technique is criticized by some researchers 
(Nitzl and Chin, 2017). Therefore, we next optimize the complete model in SmartPLS 
including the selection of the unstandardized items used to specify the latent variables of our 
model. Following such a procedure slightly changes the measurement of global transparency 
and flexibility, but the main results remain robust. In particular, TPS success is still positively 
associated with repair and internal transparency, while the total effect of TPS integration on 
TPS success – including the indirect (mediating) effects – remains unchanged (coefficient of 
0.478, p-value of 0.000, untabulated). Taken together, results from these robustness analyses 
indicate that neither the computation of our variables nor the step-wise procedure 
substantially impacts our main findings. 
Next, one could argue that our results may be biased due to omitted variables, and we 
therefore include two additional control variables that may impact TPS success, namely the 
number of profit centers (#Profit centers) and the proportion of foreign sales (Foreign 
sales).[18] The number of profit centers is a rough proxy for the number of internal 
transactions, and the proportion of foreign sales is a rough proxy for the degree of 
internationalization of a company. Taken together, these variables are a crude indicator of the 
importance of internal cross-border transactions for the whole company. The results reveal no 
substantial differences in the associations between TPS integration, the characteristics of an 
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enabling use and TPS success, yet both control variables are positively associated with TPS 
success. One potential reason for this finding could be that the higher importance of internal 
cross-border transactions translates into more sophisticated transfer pricing systems, which in 
turn are associated with higher TPS success.  
Next, we re-run our analyses based on an alternative measurement of our dependent variable 
TPS success that captures the perceived conflicts between various transfer pricing objectives. 
Our new variable, TPS conflicts, is based on five of seven initial items that measure the level 
of perceived conflict between transfer pricing objectives. Primarily, a two-component solution 
was obtained. Again, we use the factor that includes the majority of items (including the item 
that directly asks for the overall level of conflict between transfer pricing objects). The factor 
TPS conflicts explains 51 percent of the variance and has an eigenvalue of 2.57 and a 
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.76. In addition to an overall judgment of conflicts between different 
transfer pricing objectives, it further includes particular assessments of conflicts between 
coordination and internal profit determination, coordination and tax optimization, internal 
profit determination and tax compliance as well as internal profit determination and tax 
optimization. The results from the PLS analysis based on bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings 
are displayed in Panel A and Panel B of Table 7. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Consistent with our expectations, the path coefficient from TPS integration to TPS conflicts is 
negative but not significant. However, the total effect, including the indirect (mediating) 
effects, becomes significant at the 10 percent level (coefficient of -.255, p-value of 0.065, 
untabulated). The results thus suggest that the integration of the transfer pricing system into 
the management control system is associated with reduced conflict between different transfer 
pricing objectives. Again, similar to our baseline model, the relationship is mediated through 
the design variables of the transfer pricing system. However, the relationship between TPS 
integration and TPS conflicts appears to be much weaker than the relationship between TPS 
integration and TPS success. One reason for this observation might be that we dropped 
variables related to internal profit determination when considering the measurement of TPS 
integration but included them when considering TPS goal conflicts. This could also be an 
explanation for the much lower multiple R2 (0.212) in this new model. Panel B of Table 7 
presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-H3d). Surprisingly, the path 
coefficient between repair and TPS conflicts becomes positive. However, the effect is not 
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significant (coefficient of 0.160, p-value of 0.244). In contrast, the results suggest that the 
path between internal transparency and TPS conflicts, both in terms of magnitude and 
significance, is the strongest. This finding is also reflected by obtaining the highest Cohen’s 
effect size f2 for internal transparency. Therefore, a higher degree of internal transparency 
appears to be associated with a lower level of conflict between transfer pricing objectives. By 
contrast, global transparency and flexibility appear to be unrelated to TPS goal conflicts. 
Overall, the results are generally consistent with our findings from the main model (except for 
repair).  
Next, we estimate our model by ordinary least squares (OLS) because most researchers are 
more familiar with this technique for estimating relationships. To test the structural model of 
our hypotheses, we run six independent OLS analyses. The results are presented in Table 8. 
Although the estimated coefficients and the t-statistics differ from our PLS analysis (due to 
the different estimation model), the results are similar to the results from our main model. In 
particular, we obtain positive and significant associations between TPS integration, repair and 
internal transparency and TPS success. Not controlling for the use of the transfer pricing 
system, the total effect of TPS integration on TPS success equals 0.530 and is highly 
significant (p-value of 0.002). However, only 55 percent (0.291/0.530) of this total effect can 
be explained by the direct effect of TPS integration, while 45 percent of the total effect can be 
attributed to the mediating variables. As in our PLS model, the indirect effects of TPS 
integration on TPS success through repair (coefficient of 0.168, p-value of 0.037) and internal 
transparency (coefficient of 0.138, p-value of 0.043) remain similarly substantial and highly 
significant. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Finally, we address concerns regarding the validity of the responses. Since the respondents are 
primarily employed at the corporate level, one could argue that the respondents are biased 
toward the positive elements of the transfer pricing system. In particular, the perceived 
success of the transfer pricing system might be assessed differently (better) at the corporate 
level where the transfer pricing system is defined than at the divisional level where the 
transfer pricing system is actually used. We therefore investigate the mean value of Perceived 
TPS Success for the different organizational levels (see Panel B of Table 1). The results 
reveal a mean value of -0.054 for the respondents that belong to the group level, 0.724 for the 
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respondents that belong to a controlling (parent) company, 0.224 for respondents from a 
subsidiary company, 0.377 for respondents from a division within a legal entity, and -0.815 
for a respondent from other levels. These results do not indicate that respondents from the 
group level are systematically biased in their assessments of the success of the transfer pricing 
system. In addition, in the next section of the paper, we provide insights from interviews with 
respondents from three multinational enterprises that provide a more holistic picture. 
Taken together, the results from these additional analyses unanimously support the robustness 
of our main results.  
4.4. Affirmative Testimonies from Interview Data 
To further substantiate our findings, we provide additional insights into the transfer pricing 
systems of three multinational enterprises. In particular, we illuminate potential conflicts and 
problems in the use of transfer pricing and the perceived success of the transfer pricing 
system. 
We use theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt, 1989) to identify useful cases for our investigation 
based on the following criteria. First, we limit our potential sample to the manufacturing 
industry to enhance the comparability of our findings. Second, we focus on multinational 
enterprises with a substantial number of internal cross-border transactions, as essentially only 
these enterprises face a goal conflict between tax compliance and management control. Third, 
we aim to use enterprises that have implemented a single set of transfer pricing books. Again, 
only in this case does the goal conflict theoretically become evident. Moreover, focusing on 
one set of books enhances the comparability of our findings.  
Within each enterprise, we conducted one interview that lasted, on average, two hours. 
Regarding the interview subjects, we focused on those persons responsible for the transfer 
pricing system at the corporate level. In addition, we interviewed a divisional manager 
(company A) and a corporate controller (company C). The interviews were conducted 
between October and December 2016. The semi-structured interviews were guided by 
questions based on our survey questionnaire and our results. The questions were open enough 
to allow for unexpected findings. For reasons of simplicity, we focused on internal 
transactions involving tangible assets and excluded the licensing of intellectual property (IP) 
from our analysis. The interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed. 
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Panel A of Table 9 provides an overview of the sample companies A, B, and C with respect to 
the firm size in terms of sales, internationalization, organizational structure, and value chain. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
----------------------------------- 
Panel B of Table 9 outlines the transfer pricing systems of the three case companies. The 
organizational structure of company A with its various profit centers is reflected in a 
decentralized approach to transfer pricing. The central policy on transfer pricing only states 
that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s length principle. Transfer prices are 
negotiated between profit centers (based on price lists or individual prices for customer 
specific products). This approach of internal negotiations on the transfer price reflects the 
negotiating power and the functions and risks of the involved profit centers. The transfer 
pricing systems of companies B and C are rather contrary to the decentralized approach to 
transfer pricing seen in company A. Both companies have comprehensive and detailed 
transfer pricing policies at the corporate level that govern the determination of transfer prices. 
These policies determine the transfer pricing method with respect to typical intra-company 
transactions including the cost basis, markups, margins, and handling of currency 
conversions.  
Next, we provide descriptive evidence for the (enabling) use of a (single) transfer pricing 
system, which must simultaneously fulfill tax compliance and management control purposes. 
Based on the findings from analytical research, which recommends the decoupling of transfer 
prices to avoid conflicts between tax compliance and management control, we directly asked 
our interviewees about the existence of such goal conflicts in their companies. Company A’s 
interviewees observe no direct goal conflict between the two objectives; on the contrary, 
company A is convinced that tax authorities accept the negotiated transfer prices as being tax 
compliant because they correspond with their decentralized approach to controlling the group. 
Company A’s interviewee stated: “With respect to tax compliance, the total result of the legal 
entity is crucial. If this result is feasible, there are usually no further discussions with the tax 
authorities. […] Moreover, keeping one set of books is a benefit with respect to tax 
compliance, since we can always argue that there are not manipulations for tax optimization 
purposes.” However, the decentralized approach of negotiating transfer prices is accompanied 
by the high potential for conflict between the negotiating parties. If the internal transactions 
occur within the same business unit, the internal conflicts are solved by the business unit 
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manager. If different business units are involved, potential conflicts are solved by division or 
corporate representatives. Moreover, there is an arbitration panel that resolves conflicts that 
occur between the involved parties after transfer prices are determined.  
Company B’s interviewee also observes no conflict between tax compliance and management 
control: “Because the transfer pricing system has been designed in accordance with basic 
economic principles and to facilitate decentralized decision-making, it is in accordance with 
tax regulations. … Thus, we assume that if our business decisions are reasonable, then these 
decisions must also be reasonable with respect to tax compliance.” The high integration of the 
transfer pricing system with the management control system in combination with the ability to 
repair the transfer pricing system facilitates internal decision-making and reduces potential 
conflicts between the involved parties. For instance, transfer prices are integrated into the 
budgeting process of the company. If the planning results in a loss for some legal entities due 
to the planned transfer prices, the problem is escalated to a transfer pricing committee, which 
can revise the transfer pricing system accordingly. Due to the integration with the budgetary 
planning, such problems can be solved in advance. The company also provides insights into 
the practical handling of another problem of transfer pricing: the obfuscation or “swelling” of 
the internal cost structure that results from the use of the cost-plus method in multi-stage 
production processes. Such obfuscation is prevented by applying the markup of the transfer 
price solely to the production costs of each production center instead of to the total costs.[19]  
Last, but not least, company C’s interviewees perceive no conflict between management 
control and tax compliance for two reasons. First, the company’s primary objective with 
respect to transfer pricing is tax compliance. Second, in addition to tax compliance, the main 
objective of the transfer pricing system is “to not distort decentralized decision-making.” To 
ensure this, transfer prices do not affect the performance evaluation of functional center 
managers because they are evaluated based on the business unit’s residual income. The 
transfer pricing policy is detailed and comprehensive. The low degree of flexibility results in 
few conflicts between functional centers, business units or legal entities. Within each business 
unit, there are transfer pricing officers who are responsible for adherence to the transfer 
pricing policy. Problems are discussed with the corporate tax department on a monthly basis. 
In the case of severe conflicts, there is an escalation to the management board of the 
company, which ultimately resolves the conflict. 
To gather more insights into the finding that neither global transparency nor flexibility is 
found to significantly mediate the relationship between transfer pricing system integration and 
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transfer pricing system success, we directly asked our interviewees about these relationships 
in their enterprises. The results from our interviews reveal differences in the role of flexibility 
and global transparency between centralized and decentralized transfer pricing systems. As 
expected, the interviewees from the companies with a centralized transfer pricing system 
emphasize that flexibility is detrimental to tax compliance and thus to the perceived success 
of the transfer pricing system. In contrast, in the company taking a decentralized approach, 
flexibility is, by definition, part of the transfer pricing system and thus important for its 
success. However, it must be noted that the central transfer pricing policy of the decentralized 
company only states that transfer prices must comply with the arm’s length principle, which 
allows for much more flexibility than a comprehensive and detailed internal transfer pricing 
policy. Another discrepancy is that, for the two companies with a more centralized approach, 
both internal and global transparency are important for the success of their transfer pricing 
system. For the company with the decentralized approach, only internal (but not global) 
transparency is perceived as being important. Thus, the different level of decentralization seen 
in the companies in our sample might explain the insignificant results for global transparency 
and flexibility that we obtain from the PLS analysis. In none of the case companies did we 
find severe conflicts between management control and tax compliance, which is partly due to 
the high integration between the transfer pricing system and the management control system. 
In sum, there is substantial descriptive evidence supporting the presumed enabling use of a 
transfer pricing system through which firms are able to fulfill tax compliance and 
management control at the same time. Moreover, this result was confirmed by officers 
responsible for transfer pricing systems at the corporate level, by a divisional manager 
(company A) and by a corporate controller (company B), which mitigates the concern that the 
perceived success of a transfer pricing system is systematically over-evaluated by respondents 
from the corporate level. In particular, different assessments are most likely to occur within 
strongly decentralized organizations. However, we find no support for the hypothesis that the 
success of the integration is overstated by people from the corporate level of company A (nor 
do we find any for the other two companies). Moreover, the short rudimentary descriptions 
illustrate the complexity of transfer pricing systems in practice and of their integration into the 
management control system. All of the interviewees agreed that monitoring and documenting 
transfer prices on a transaction-by-transaction basis is impossible due to the huge number of 
transactions. Tax audits therefore examine the tax compliance of the firms’ transfer pricing 
systems from an overall perspective and examine the appropriateness of the global profit 
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allocation and of internal transfer pricing policy, making the overall perspective of the 
corporate level more dominant. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines how the integration of a single-book tax compliant transfer pricing 
system into the management control system affects the perceived success of the transfer 
pricing system. While results from the analytical transfer pricing literature suggest the 
decoupling of transfer prices to overcome conflicts between tax compliance and management 
control, we draw on the theoretical framework of Adler and Borys (1996) and suggest that 
potential conflicts may be overcome by an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. In 
particular, we hypothesize that the level of transfer pricing system integration is positively 
correlated with its success and that this relationship is mediated through an enabling use of the 
system, which is reflected in the characteristics of repair, internal transparency, global 
transparency, and flexibility.  
Based on a sample of 38 Swiss multinational enterprises, the results from structural equation 
modeling using the PLS technique partly support our reasoning. In particular, transfer pricing 
system integration is indeed positively associated with transfer pricing system success, and 
this relationship is mediated through repair and internal transparency. Both characteristics 
support an enabling use of the transfer pricing system because managers can truly understand 
how the transfer prices are determined and are able to intervene if fundamental problems 
occur. Obviously, these characteristics help to avoid deteriorated management control in an 
integrated transfer pricing system. However, neither global transparency nor flexibility is 
found to significantly mediate the relationship between transfer pricing system integration and 
transfer pricing system success. In the case of transfer pricing, it thus appears that global 
transparency, due to the enhanced comparability of value creation across responsibility 
centers, potentially fuels conflicts between responsibility centers and thus is negatively related 
to transfer pricing system success. With respect to flexibility, we believe that the disregard of 
internal transfer pricing policies may be detrimental to the purpose of tax compliance and is 
thus negatively associated with transfer pricing system success. Instead firms may aim to 
generally describe exceptions known ex ante in the transfer pricing policies or to adjust the 
internal guidelines to formally account for deviations.  
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Our survey-based findings are substantiated by additional insights into the transfer pricing 
systems of three multinational enterprises. The case companies are multinational companies 
in the manufacturing industry with substantial internal cross-border transactions that use a 
single set of transfer pricing books. One company applies a decentralized approach of 
negotiated transfer prices, while the other two companies apply a centralized approach with 
detailed internal transfer pricing guidelines that govern the determination of transfer prices. 
Tax compliance is the primary transfer pricing objective for all three firms. As expected, we 
find internal transparency and the potential to repair the transfer pricing system in the case of 
fundamental problems to be important factors in the success of integrated transfer pricing 
systems. However, the benefit of global transparency and of the flexible use of the transfer 
pricing system might depend on the degree of centralization in the approach. Whereas greater 
global transparency and less flexibility appear to be beneficial for centralized approaches, the 
opposite may be true for decentralized companies.  
Nevertheless, our results should be interpreted cautiously, as our study is subject to several 
limitations, which give rise to future research possibilities. Specifically, the typical limitations 
of survey-based research apply, namely, measurement error and nonresponse error (Visser et 
al., 2000). First, all variables of interest are latent constructs, and our study thus requires the 
development of new measurements. Although the validity and reliability of our latent 
variables are generally satisfactory, future research could further improve some of our 
measurements, in particular, that of transfer pricing system integration as well as the success 
of the transfer pricing system. Moreover, both dependent and independent variables are 
obtained through the same survey, creating the potential for CMV. We investigate this 
concern in the robustness section of this paper (section 4.3) and find no indication that our 
results are severely biased due to CMV. In addition, our questionnaire is addressed to 
employees at the corporate level, which allows us to capture an overall view on transfer 
pricing. We thus cannot completely rule out that our respondents are systematically biased 
toward the positive elements of the transfer pricing system. While we attempt to mitigate this 
concern through insights gained from interviews with respondents from multinational 
enterprises, future research could involve multiple points of view from the same company by 
addressing both corporate level managers and profit center managers.  
Second, our results are based on a limited number of observations from one country. 
However, because national transfer pricing legislation in Switzerland completely adheres to 
that of the OECD and there is no supplementary transfer pricing legislation, the restriction to 
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one country could also enhance the generalizability of our results across countries without 
specific national transfer pricing legislation. In addition, we employ the PLS methodology, 
which is particularly useful for small sample sizes. Another concern may arise from the focus 
on a single point in time, which does not yield insights into the development of transfer 
pricing systems over time or provide causal evidence. Further research could therefore 
investigate whether our findings also hold for companies from other countries and/or examine 
causal effects based on longitudinal data.  
Third, this study applies to the totality of intercompany transactions instead of focusing on 
single transactions. Such an approach enables us to provide a more holistic picture of transfer 
pricing in practice and is also in line with a recent call of Rossing and Rohde (2014). 
Nevertheless, it hampers the comparability of our findings with prior survey-based research 
on transfer pricing. Despite this limitation, we are confident that our study adds a new and 
important perspective to the ongoing discussion on transfer pricing. Both survey-based and 
case-based research could build on our model and more closely investigate the relationships 
between transfer pricing system integration and an enabling use of the transfer pricing system. 
Moreover, the results from our interviews indicate that it might be particularly fruitful to 
consider the level of centralization of the transfer pricing system when further investigating 
the integration of the transfer pricing system into the management control system.  
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Notes
 
1 The "standard" transfer pricing model was introduced by Hirshleifer (1956). Subsequent studies incorporate 
information asymmetry (e.g., Banker and Datar, 1992; Ronen and Balachandran, 1988) and incomplete 
contracting (e.g., Edlin and Reichelstein, 1995). A detailed review of the analytical transfer pricing 
literature is provided by Göx and Schiller (2007). 
2  In this context, Rossing and Rohde (2014) refer to the term “transfer pricing system performance” and 
distinguish between four different performance dimensions, namely functional, economic, organizational, 
and strategic performance. 
3 Companies from the financial services sector were excluded because of fundamental differences in the 
value creation process and thus in internal transactions compared with companies from other industries. 
4 The Bartlett test of sphericity supports the fit between the model and the correlation matrix for all variables 
(p < 0.000). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure suggests sampling adequacy for all factor analyses with a 
measure of sampling adequacy (MSA) value above 0.588. 
5 Because the underlying theoretical model does not assume that the constructs are uncorrelated, the oblique 
rotation method is the most suitable (Hair et al., 2010). 
6 For a sample size of 50, a 0.05 significance level and an 80 percent power level, factor loadings above 0.75 
are considered significant (Hair et al., 2010, p. 117). Therefore, the critical value of a factor loading to meet 
the criteria mentioned would be slightly increased for a sample size of 38. However, many of the factor 
loadings would still be above or at least be approximately at the threshold value. 
7 Hair et al. (2010, p. 125) suggest a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.60 for exploratory research as the critical value 
while stressing the inflation of Cronbach’s alpha due to an increase in the number of items. Keeping in 
mind that only 3 items are used and that a broader range of the sample can further inflate the alpha statistic 
(Cortina, 1993), an alpha statistic of 0.51 is judged to be low but acceptable. 
8  Specifically, Chin and Newsted (1999) show that the PLS method produces feasible results starting with a 
sample size of 20 observations. 
9 Table 4 therefore displays the maximum shared variance for each variable. 
10 To check for multicollinearity of the latent variables, the variance inflation factors are calculated. The 
factors range from 1.10 to 1.44 (with a mean of 1.31) and thus do not indicate any problems (threshold 
values are between 5 and 10). 
11 Therefore, a pretest of the survey was conducted with experts in the topic in order to adjust any questions 
that may have initially been difficult to understand according to their suggestions. 
12 Note that the factor analysis includes all 19 items used to measure TPS integration, repair, internal 
transparency, global transparency, flexibility and TPS success. 
13 Financial performance is measured by three items and has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.95. The items ask for the 
respondents’ assessment of the firm’s return on sales, sales growth and financial performance in 
comparison to the firm’s competitors. 
14 Note that there are different procedures to identify the concrete value of CMV for a correlation, which in 
turn result in different values for the respective correlation coefficients. 
15 Even lowering this critical value to 0.35 does not impact our results with respect to the variable 
compositions. 
16 Note that effect sizes of 0.02, 0.15 and 0.35 are interpreted as small, medium and large according to Cohen 
(1988). 
17 For the negative (and not significant) associations between global transparency (as well as flexibility) and 
TPS success, see also our affirmative testimonies from interview data below. 
18 Note that we include the standardized values of these variables in the PLS analysis. 
19 The total costs include material and production costs. Material costs in turn include the costs of internal 
products (i.e., the transfer prices paid to the upstream production centers). 
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Table 1. Sample distribution 
Panel A: Sample distribution by industry group 
By industry 
N 
Mechanical and plant engineering 8 
Pharma/medical and bio technology 5 
Transport/logistics/public transportation 5 
Building and raw materials/chemistry/synthetics 5 
Consumer goods 4 
Utilities 2 
Electronics 2 
Telecommunications 1 
Other 6 
Total 38 
Panel B: Sample distribution by organizational level 
By organizational level 
 
Group level 31 
Controlling company 2 
Subsidiary company 3 
Division within a legal entity 1 
Other 1 
Total 38 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample distribution by industry group. Panel B of Table 1 reports the sample 
distribution by organizational level.   
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Table 2. Principal component analysis (Oblimin rotated) 
No. Item 
TPS 
Integration Repair 
Internal 
Transparency 
Global 
Transparency Flexibility 
Perceived  
TPS Success 
1 Our transfer pricing system is fully integrated into the management control 
system of our company. 0.765      
2 Transfer prices are incorporated as cost or sales prices into the budgetary 
planning of our profit centers. 0.762      
3 We integrate information from cost accounting into the determination of transfer 
pricing. 0.607      
4 If fundamental problems occur, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) 
affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer pricing.  0.806 0.125 0.070 0.054  
5 We openly discuss problems with transfer pricing in our company.  0.742 0.197 0.205 -0.053  
6 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing know and 
understand how transfer prices are determined in our company.  0.284 0.799 -0.063 0.032  
7 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing have 
access to the relevant data (e.g., costs) that affect transfer prices.  -0.031 0.812 -0.082 0.083  
8 Our company keeps detailed records on our transfer pricing system.   0.266 0.750 -0.271 -0.065  
9 Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing have 
unlimited access to documentation on our transfer pricing system.   -0.041 0.800 0.219 -0.041  
10 Our transfer pricing system helps to clarify the value creation of each 
responsibility center.   0.013 0.124 0.832 0.147  
11 Due to our transfer pricing system, we are able to compare the financial 
performance of each responsibility center with that of other centers.   0.321 -0.377 0.778 -0.079  
12 In particular cases, we can disregard our internal guidelines on transfer pricing to 
determine transfer prices.  -0.337 0.130 0.250 0.808  
13 In particular cases (e.g., major orders), our transfer pricing is flexibly handled.  0.251 0.200 0.041 0.768  
14 There are no exceptions to our internal guidelines/regulations on transfer pricing 
(reverse-coded item).  0.176 -0.448 -0.186 0.791  
15 Overall, we are very satisfied with our transfer pricing system.      0.836 
16 Overall, the benefits of our transfer pricing system outweigh the costs.      0.788 
17 Our transfer pricing system complies completely with tax regulations.      0.717 
18 Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves our internal objectives for transfer 
pricing completely.       0.835 
19 Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves our external objectives for transfer 
pricing completely.      0.774 
33 
 
Table 3. Variable definitions 
Variable  
TPS Integration 
General definition: 
The integration of a tax compliant transfer pricing system into the management 
control system in terms of the scope and intensity of using tax compliant 
transfer prices for management control purposes 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Our transfer pricing system is fully integrated into the management 
control system of our company. 
• Transfer prices are incorporated as cost or sales prices into the budget 
planning of our profit centers. 
• We integrate information from cost accounting into the determination 
of transfer pricing. 
• Our transfer prices influence the performance evaluation of our profit 
centers. 
• Our transfer prices influence (indirectly) the variable compensation of 
the management of the responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers). 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Tax compliant transfer prices are part of cost accounting, the budget 
planning of divisions, the profitability measure for the value chain, the 
EBIT of a legal entity (Firm A) 
• The tax compliant transfer price is part of the OVC (Operating Value 
Contribution) (Firm C) 
Repair 
General definition: 
Inconsistencies and failures in the transfer pricing system would be detected and 
repaired through adjustments of the transfer pricing system; for instance, a cost 
plus transfer price that does not provide the supplying division with an 
appropriate profit might be adjusted 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Ideas for improvement on transfer pricing by the responsibility centers 
(e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing are very welcome. 
• If fundamental problems occur, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit 
centers) affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer 
pricing determination. 
• If original conditions change, the responsibility centers (e.g., profit 
centers) affected by transfer pricing initiate a revision of the transfer 
pricing determination. 
• We openly discuss problems with transfer pricing in our company. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• If fundamental problems occur, divisions or business units can initiate a 
revision (Firm A) 
• Most importantly, the transfer price must enable the sales unit to make 
sales, more precisely, the sales they should make (Firm A) 
• If there is a problem (or a change in the business model), then it’s 
discussed in the TPS working groups and/or in the TPS board. Working 
groups have a meeting once a week or monthly depending on the 
agenda; the TPS board meets monthly. Decisions may lead to 
organizational changes or a change of the TPS policy (Firm B) 
• If, in exceptional cases, well-founded deviations from the TPS policy 
occur, then the deviation will be discussed in the tax meetings and 
usually the deviation will become a standard (Firm C) 
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Variable  
Internal Transparency 
General definition: 
The transfer pricing system is comprehensively documented; (decentralized) 
management understands how transfer prices are determined and has access to 
all relevant data 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand how transfer prices are determined in our 
company. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
have access to the relevant data (e.g., costs) that affect transfer prices. 
• Our company keeps detailed records on our transfer pricing system. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
have unlimited access to documentation on our transfer pricing system. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• There is transparency in the plants and the sales units (Firm A) 
• There is transparency in the legal entities (Firm B) 
• Transfer pricing methods and markups are public information within 
the group (Firm B) 
Global Transparency 
General definition: 
(Decentralized) management understand the role of (tax compliant) transfer 
prices in the broader context, i.e., the overall company perspective 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand the achieved internal objectives of transfer 
pricing in our company. 
• Responsibility centers (e.g., profit centers) affected by transfer pricing 
know and understand the achieved external objectives of transfer 
pricing in our company. 
• Our transfer pricing system helps to clarify the value creation of each 
responsibility center. 
• Due to our transfer pricing system, we are able to compare the financial 
performance of the responsibility centers. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• There is no global transparency since the ERP systems are not 
connected. There is no transparency about value chain profitability 
(Firm A) 
• There is global transparency across business sectors and business 
divisions (Firm C) 
Flexibility 
General definition: 
Flexibility refers to the ability to disregard the internal transfer pricing policies 
and to flexibly handle the determination of transfer prices in particular cases 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Our transfer pricing system strictly complies with internal guidelines 
on transfer pricing. 
• In particular cases, we can disregard our internal guidelines on transfer 
pricing to determine transfer prices. 
• In particular cases (e.g., major order), our transfer pricing is flexibly 
handled. 
• There are no exceptions to our internal guidelines/regulations on 
transfer pricing. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Flexibility is rather low. Only a small minority of internal transactions 
are allowed to deviate from our transfer pricing policy. Such deviations 
must be discussed and agreed upon by the corporate tax department 
(Firm B) 
• There is almost no possibility to deviate from our transfer pricing 
policy; besides, there is a strong tendency over the previous years to 
rule out any deviations from the transfer pricing policy (Firm C) 
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Variable  
Perceived TPS Success 
General definition: 
Perceived transfer pricing system success is the assessment of overall 
satisfaction with the tax compliant transfer pricing system and, in particular, the 
satisfaction with how tax compliant transfer prices fulfill management control 
objectives 
Operationalization for the questionnaire: 
• Overall, we are very satisfied with our transfer pricing system. 
• Overall, the benefits of our transfer pricing system outweigh the costs. 
• Our transfer pricing system complies completely with tax regulations. 
• Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves completely our internal 
objectives for transfer pricing. 
• Overall, our transfer pricing system achieves completely our external 
objectives for transfer pricing. 
Examples/quotes from interview data: 
• Success is defined by tax compliance, good decision-making and few 
conflicts (Firm A, B and C) 
• We are fairly pleased with our transfer pricing system since it works: 
there are only few conflicts with tax authorities and at the same time, 
the transfer pricing system doesn’t disturb management control and 
business decision-making (Firm C) 
Table 3 provides (general) definitions, an operationalization (used in the questionnaire) and practical examples 
of all variables. Those items used in the second step of our baseline model (initial step-wise procedure of first 
performing PCA and second, testing our hypotheses based on the PLS technique) are highlighted in gray.  
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Table 4. Validity and reliability measures of variables used in the PLS analysis 
Variable Composite reliability 
Average variance 
extracted 
Maximum shared  
variance 
TPS Integration 0.752 0.504 0.229 
Repair 0.855 0.746 0.368 
Internal Transparency 0.895 0.682 0.389 
Global Transparency 0.833 0.716 0.086 
Flexibility 0.724 0.510 0.075 
Perceived TPS Success 0.893 0.626 0.389 
Table 4 reports validity and reliability measures for all of the variables used in the PLS analysis. The first 
column shows the composite reliability, and the second column shows the average variance extracted of a 
variable. Column three shows each variable’s highest shared variance with any of the other variables.  
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the untransformed variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
TPS Integration 38 5.00 1.31 2.00 7.00 
Repair 38 4.76 1.38 2.50 7.00 
Internal Transparency 38 4.53 1.49 1.75 6.75 
Global Transparency 38 3.84 1.42 1.00 7.00 
Flexibility 38 4.18 1.63 1.00 7.00 
Perceived TPS Success 38 5.08 1.12 2.00 6.80 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the standardized variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std Dev Min Max 
TPS Integration 38 0.00 0.71 -1.71 1.08 
Repair 38 0.00 0.84 -2.08 1.59 
Internal Transparency 38 0.00 0.83 -1.62 1.23 
Global Transparency 38 0.00 0.85 -1.72 1.90 
Flexibility 38 0.00 0.80 -1.57 1.39 
Perceived TPS Success 38 0.00 0.79 -2.19 1.23 
 
Panel C: Sampling of firms along formalization type and level of TPS Integration 
Formalization Type Level of TPS Integration 
 
Low TPS Integration 
(n=20) 
High TPS Integration 
(n=18) 
Coercive 65% 28% 
Enabling 35% 72% 
Total 100% 100% 
 
Panel D: Pearson correlation coefficients 
 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) 
1) TPS Integration 1      
2) Internal Transparency 0.388** 1     
3) Flexibility 0.183 0.061 1    
4) Repair 0.336** 0.426***  0.172 1   
5) Global Transparency 0.246 -0.054 0.274* 0.293* 1  
6) Perceived TPS Success 0.478*** 0.624*** 0.033 0.607*** -0.039 1 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the untransformed (Panel A) and the standardized variables (Panel B) 
as well as the sampling of firms along formalization type and level of TPS integration (Panel C) and correlation 
statistics (Panel D). All statistics are presented for the full sample of 38 firms. Panel C reports bivariate Pearson 
correlation coefficients.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for a two-tailed test 
of statistical significance, respectively.  
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Table 6. Results of the PLS analysis  
 
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 
TPS 
Integration 
std. error t-value p-value mult. R2 
Repair 0.336** 0.178 1.895 0.029 0.113 
Internal Transparency 0.388*** 0.157 2.465 0.007 0.151 
Global Transparency 0.246* 0.175 1.408 0.080 0.061 
Flexibility 0.183 0.171 1.068 0.143 0.033 
Perceived TPS Success  0.263* 0.170 1.547 0.061  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 
Perceived 
TPS 
Success 
std. error t-value p-value 
Effect size 
f2 
Repair 0.450*** 0.136 3.302 0.000 0.360 
Internal Transparency 0.321** 0.160 2.005 0.022 0.181 
Global Transparency -0.203 0.178 1.141 0.127 0.082 
Flexibility -0.057 0.113 0.503 0.308 0.007 
TPS Integration 0.263* 0.170 1.547 0.061 0.133 
Mult. R2 0.605     
Panel A of Table 6 presents path coefficients and significance levels from the PLS analysis based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings for the first two sets of hypotheses (H1 and H2a-d). Panel B of Table 6 
presents the results for the third set of hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the effect size f2.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, for a 
one-tailed test of statistical significance. 
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Table 7. Results of the PLS analysis with TPS Conflicts instead of Perceived TPS 
Success 
Panel A: Results for hypotheses H1 and H2a-H2d      
Paths to Paths from     
 
TPS 
Integration 
std. error t-value p-value mult. R2 
Repair 0.336** 0.177 1.904 0.028 0.113 
Internal Transparency 0.388*** 0.155 2.507 0.006 0.151 
Global Transparency 0.246* 0.172 1.429 0.077 0.061 
Flexibility 0.183 0.169 1.080 0.140 0.033 
TPS Conflicts  -0.129 0.221 0.584 0.280  
 
Panel B: Results for hypotheses H3a-H3d      
Paths from Paths to     
 
TPS 
Conflicts 
std. error t-value p-value 
Effect size 
f2 
Repair 0.160 0.231 0.694 0.244 0.023 
Internal Transparency -0.434*** 0.207 2.092 0.018 0.166 
Global Transparency 0.016 0.273 0.057 0.477 0.000 
Flexibility -0.082 0.163 0.501 0.308 0.008 
TPS Integration -0.129 0.221 0.584 0.280  
Mult. R2 0.212     
Panel A of Table 9 presents path coefficients and significance levels from the PLS analysis based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 drawings (H1 and H2a-d). Panel B of Table 9 presents the results for the third set of 
hypotheses (H3a-d) and additionally reports the effect size f2.  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels for a one-tailed test 
of statistical significance, respectively. 
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Table 8. Results of the OLS regression 
(1) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.291** 0.139 2.090 0.044 
Repair 0.411*** 0.119 3.450 0.002 
Internal_transparency 0.306** 0.125 2.440 0.020 
Global_transparency -0.188 0.115 -1.640 0.109 
Flexibility -0.056 0.114 -0.490 0.625 
Mult. R2 0.605    
     
(2) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.530*** 0.160 3.310 0.002 
Mult. R2 0.229    
  
(3) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.407** 0.188 2.170 0.036 
Mult. R2 0.113    
 
(4) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.451** 0.176 2.560 0.015 
Mult. R2 0.151    
 
(5) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.294 0.190 1.550 0.130 
Mult. R2 0.061    
 
(6) Coefficient std. error t-value p-value 
TPS_integration 0.205 0.181 1.130 0.265 
Mult. R2 0.034    
Table 10 reports ordinary least squares coefficient estimates, standard errors, t-values, p-values and significance 
levels for equations (1) – (6).  
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively, for a 
two-tailed test of statistical significance. Coefficient estimates in Table 10 are specified by the following 
equations:  
(1) TPS_success = β1*TPS_integration + β2*Repair+ β3*Internal_transparency + 
β4*Global_transparency + β5*Flexibility + ε 
(2) TPS_success = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(3) Repair = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(4) Internal_transparency = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(5) Global_transparency = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
(6) Flexibility = β1*TPS_integration + ε 
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Table 9. Overview of the sample companies 
Panel A: Overview of the sample companies by organizational structure 
 A B C 
Firm size (sales in 
2015) 
Approx. 35 billion CHF Approx. 3 billion CHF Approx. 76 billion CHF 
Internationalization • Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 70 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
• Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 80 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
• Revenues in various 
jurisdictions and 
currencies 
• Approx. 80 percent of 
sales generated in 
foreign countries 
Organizational 
structure of the 
firm 
• 4 global divisions 
• Each division is 
comprised of various 
business units (BU) 
• Each BU is comprised 
of various functional 
centers 
• Product selling and 
system selling 
• 2 global divisions 
• No division managers, 
divisions are managed 
by the board 
• Each division is 
comprised of various 
functional centers 
• 4 global divisions  
• Each business sector is 
comprised of various 
business units (BU) 
• Each business unit is 
comprised of various 
functional centers 
Organizational 
structure of the 
value chain 
• Production centers, 
sales and distribution 
centers, service centers 
• Production center, 
service center, product 
center, sales center 
• Entrepreneur, contract 
manufacturer, service 
provider, distributor  
Panel B: Overview of the sample companies by transfer pricing system 
 A B C 
Internal transfer 
pricing guidelines 
• Internal transfer pricing 
guidelines that require 
compliance with the 
arm’s length principle 
• Detailed and 
comprehensive internal  
transfer pricing 
guidelines 
• Detailed and 
comprehensive internal 
transfer pricing 
guidelines 
Transfer pricing 
objective 
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective 
• Enhance decentralized 
decision-making 
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective  
• Facilitate decentralized 
decision-making  
• Tax compliance as most 
important objective  
• No distortion of 
decentralized decision-
making  
Basic structure • Transfer prices are 
negotiated between the 
profit centers 
• Product selling: transfer 
prices are primarily 
determined by the 
production center 
• System selling: transfer 
prices are primarily 
determined by the sales 
center 
• Transfer prices for the 
production centers are 
determined based on 
standard costs plus a 
markup 
• Transfer prices for the 
sales centers are 
determined based on the 
resale price minus a 
margin 
• The residual across the 
supply chain is allocated 
to the product center  
• Transfer prices for the 
contract manufacturers 
and service providers 
are determined based on 
standard costs plus a 
markup 
• Transfer prices for the 
distributors are 
determined based on the 
resale price minus a 
margin 
• The residual across the 
supply chain is allocated 
to the entrepreneur 
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Figure 1: Structural equation model  
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